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PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS: LIMITATIONS
AND RELEASES
INTRODUCTION
On November 20, 1959, Hazeltine Research Incorporated (HRI)
brought a patent infringement suit against Zenith Radio Corporation,
claiming that television sets manufactured by Zenith infringed HRI's
patents on a particular automatic control system.' In its answer, Zenith
alleged that it was not guilty of infringement, that the patent asserted
was invalid' and that HRI was guilty of patent misuse and unclean
hands through conspiracy with foreign patent pools .8
On May 22, 1963, Zenith filed a counterclaim for treble damages'
1
 Hazeltine Research Incorporated is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Hazeltine
Corporation, a New York corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of electronic
equipment. It is engaged in accumulating domestic and foreign patents for use in its
patent licensing business in the electronics industry. Its policy has been to grant electronics
manufacturers a standard package license according to which they are free from charges of
infringement under any present patents, and under any patents which it might obtain dur-
ing the term of the licensing agreement, which is usually five years. Licensees are required
to pay royalties on their entire production, whether or not their products employ any of
HRI's patents. Whenever HRI decides that the manufacture or sale of any particular
apparatus infringes upon any of its patent rights, its policy has been to bring suit against
those manufacturers and distributors not protected by the standard package license.
Until 1959, Zenith Radio Corporation possessed the right to use all HRI domestic
patents under HRI's standard package license. In that year, however, with the expiration
of Zenith's license imminent, Zenith declined to accept HRI's offer to renew, asserting
that it no longer required a license from HRI. HRI then asserted that Zenith was in-
fringing at least four of its patents in the manufacture and sale of monochrome television
receivers, and it offered to grant Zenith Less than the entire package at a different royalty
rate. Zenith refused to sign either the package license renewal agreement or the pro-
posed alternative agreement. After negotiations had proceeded to a stalemate, HRI filed
suit. Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. Si, 59-70 (N.D. Ill.
1965).
2
 HRI's application for the patent, originally filed in 1946, was amended in 1949.
HRI called the 1949 application a "continuation" of its original application, but Zenith
argued that since the amendment contained new matter, it was actually a new application.
Zenith further argued that the patent asserted was invalid because its subject matter had
been published and used by the public for more than a year before the 1949 filing date,
and because the claims under the patent failed to describe any invention patentable over
prior art. Zenith also maintained that the patent asserted was unenforceable by reason
of misuse. Id. at 59-66.
3
 According to Zenith's argument in the district court, HRI for several years had
been an active participant in Canadian Radio Patents Limited, Australian Radio
Technical Services and Patents Company Pty, Limited (ARTS), and a British patent
pool. Each of these organizations was allegedly a vehicle by which several of the world's
largest electronics companies made use of each other's patents, granted local patent
licenses, and regulated the terms and conditions under which the patents of member
companies were licensed in the respective territorial markets. Members agreed that the
only licenses employed by them would be standard package licenses limited to local
manufacture, and that no license would be issued permitting the export of radio and
television receivers from the United States into those markets. Id. at 72-76.
4 Under Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 15 (1970), any person injured in
his business or property by reason of conduct forbidden by the antitrust laws may sue
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and injunctive relief, alleging that HRI had violated the Sherman and
Clayton Acts 5 by its participation, along with Canadian, Australian
and British patent pools, in a conspiracy to exclude Zenith's products
from the markets of those foreign countries.° The U.S. government had
brought a civil antitrust suit on November 24, 1958, against other
American companies which had participated in these pools; that
suit was terminated as to all parties on November 1, 1962. 7
A year after the taking of evidence on HRI's patent infringement
claim and Zenith's antitrust counterclaim, the district court, sitting
without a jury, found for Zenith on both claims.° Soon thereafter, HRI
moved to amend its reply to the counterclaim and to reopen the record
for the taking of additional evidence. The motion sought leave to
assert the defenses of limitations° and release" as well as to demon-
strate that Zenith's damage in the British and Australian markets had
resulted primarily from the operation , of government embargoes, tar-
therefor in any district court of the United States and recover threefold the damages
be has sustained.
6 Clayton Act-15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1970); Sherman Act-15 U.S.C. § 12-27 (1970).
6
 According to its argument before the district court, Zenith had persistently at-
tempted to export its radios and televisions to distributors and dealers in Great Britain,
Canada and Australia, but it had been largely unsuccessful because these distributors and
dealers had been threatened with suit by the patent pools. Zenith and its subsidiary,
the Rauland Corporation, had initiated litigation "against some of the American companies
in the Canadian pool by means of a counterclaim in a patent infringement suit initiated
by Radio Corporation of America. In 1957, as a result of this litigation, RCA, Western
Electric Corporation and General Electric Corporation were released from all claims
against them arising from pre-1957 conduct and these companies were enjoined from
participation in the conspiracy insofar as radios and black-and-white television sets
were concerned. At the same time Zenith was grimted $10,000,000 in damages as well as
royalty-free world-wide rights under the inventions and patents of those companies
issued prior to 1957. Soon thereafter, Zenith began to ship radios to Canada, but it
still suffered from the operations of the patent pool in excluding its television sets. It was
shortly after Zenith received a letter from the manager of the Canadian pool advising it
that post-1957 patents would be asserted against' it that HRI filed its original complaint
in this suit. 239 F. Supp. at 72-76.
7
 United States v. General Electric Co., terminated by consent decree as to N. V.
Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken, Trade Cas. 11 70,342 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1962); terminated
as to Westinghouse Electric Corp., Trade Cas. 11 70,428 (S.D.N.Y. September 4, 1962);
terminated as to General Electric Co., Trade Cas. 11 70,546 (S.D.N.Y. November 1,
1962).
8 Specifically, the court entered preliminary findings of fact and conclusions of law
that HRI had failed to establish any cause of action against Zenith, that HRI had mis-
used its patents, and that Zenith had been damaged in stated amounts in all three foreign
markets. The court found grounds for, injunction and damages against Hazeltine Re-
search, Inc., and its parent,, Hazeltine Corp. In so doing, it relied upon a pre-trial
stipulation that the research company and the parent corporation were to be considered
as an entity for the purposes of this suit. 239 F. Supp. at 69.
9 Damages are recoverable under the federal antitrust laws only If suit therefor is
"commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued," as required by § 4B
of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15b (1970)), plus any additional time during which the
statute of limitations is tolled.
to HRI claimed that part or all of Zenith's damages were barred by the releases
described in note 6 supra.
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ifs, and other technical factors. The district court permitted the de-
fenses to be filed, but it denied HRI's motion for a judgment based on
them. The court also heard HRI's additional evidence concerning the
British and Australian markets and eventually reduced its damage
award for those markets. The court, however, refused to modify its
findings or conclusions as to the Canadian markeel
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed on the
ground that Zenith had failed to prove injury to its business in any of
the foreign markets as a result of the conspiracies. 12 On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court found that Zenith had proved damages
in the Canadian market, but not in the British and Australian markets,
and it remanded the case to the court of appeals for resolution of the
remaining issues with respect to Canada." On remand, the court of
appeals found that the trial court had erroneously rejected HRI's de-
fenses of limitations and release on their merits. The court therefore
held that Zenith was barred from recovering damages flowing from any
misconduct on the part of HRI prior to certain releases given by
Zenith to HRI's co-conspirators. The court further held that Zenith
was barred from recovering that part of its damages in the Canadian
market which had been caused by conspiratorial conduct prior to the
commencement of the four-year period allowed by statute." The court
of appeals remanded the case to the trial court to determine what por-
tion of Zenith's damages arising between 1959 and 1963 had resulted
from conduct occurring before that period and to reduce the award of
damages accordingly." Before the district court could consider the
11 For an account of the post-trial proceedings, see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 105-07 (1969).
12 The Second Circuit, however, affirmed the trial court's treble damage award for
patent misuse. It further held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the re-
search company's parent corporation, and that the stipulation relied upon (see note S
supra) was an insufficient basis for entering judgment against the parent corporation.
Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 388 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1967).
18 The Supreme Court agreed with the holding of the court of appeals that the
district court lacked jurisdiction over the parent corporation, but it also held that the
district court had properly granted injunctive relief against the research company's
participation in the conspiracy restricting Zenith's trade in the Canadian market. The
Court also noted that the district court's refusal to disturb its original findings with
respect to the Canadian market was a rejection of HRI's defenses either on the merits
or on the ground that they had been waived under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h). 395 U.S. at
117 n.13.
14 See note 9 supra.
16 Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 418 F.2d 21, 23 (7th Cir. 1969)
Zenith had claimed that the statute of limitations was tolled by the operation of 5(b)
of the Clayton Act (see note 19 infra) during the pendency of the original government
suit against General Electric. However, the court of appeals decided that Zenith's tolling
claim was not properly before it because it had not been properly raised at trial. The
court held that, if the tolling argument had been properly raised, the law of that circuit
would have required rejection of that argument. The court further held that since
HRI was an unnamed joint tortfeasor and Zenith did not expressly reserve any rights
against HRI, the releases given by Zenith to HRI's co-conspirators in 1957 barred re-
covery of all damages flowing from any misconduct of HRI prior to the dates of the
releases. 418 F.2d at 23-25.
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issue on remand, the Supreme Court granted Zenith's petition for
certiorari" and, in an antitrust decision of major importance, held:
(1) the statute of limitations for private antitrust suits is tolled against
all participants in a conspiracy that is the object of a government suit
whether or not these participants are named as defendants or conspira-
tors in the government action; and (2) the effect of a release upon
antitrust co-conspirators is to be determined in accordance with the
intentions of the parties to that release. In accordance with these hold-
ings, the Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals and re-
manded with instructions to reinstate the judgment of the trial court
with respect to Canada."
The Supreme Court's ruling in Zenith is likely to have a substan-
tial effect on the burden of sustaining affirmative defenses in private
antitrust suits. Furthermore, the judicial attitude reflected in the
Court's approach in this case is likely to have a considerable effect on
antitrust law in general. It is the purpose of this comment to examine
the line of cases that have considered the policy which underlies the
tolling of limitations in antitrust cases. The comment will then attempt
to determine the applicability of the newly-announced "intention" rule
regarding release of antitrust co-conspirators. Finally, the comment will
consider generally the Court's rationale in reaching its decision and the
possible effects the case may have on antitrust enforcement.
I. THE BACKGROUND
A. Tolling Of Limitations
Section 5 of the Clayton Act contains two principal provisions.
The first of these permits the private plaintiff to use any final judg-
ment against the defendant in a government suit as prima facie evi-
dence of a violation of the antitrust laws." The second tolls the statute
of limitations in private antitrust actions during the pendency of a gov-
ernment suit on which the actions are based." The two provisions were
le Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 979 (1970).
17 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, rehearing denied,
401 U.S. 1015 (1971).
1 B 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1970), which provides that:
A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or
criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the
antitrust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima
facie evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by
any other party against such defendant under said laws or by the United States
under section 15a of this title, as to all matters respecting which said judgment
or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, That
this section shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered in actions
under section 15a of this title.
10 15 U.S.C. 16(b), which provides that:
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States
to prevent, restrain, or punish violations of any of the antitrust laws, but not
including an action under section 15a of this title, the running of the statute
of limitations in respect of every private right of action arising under said laws
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part of one undivided section until each was given the status of a dis-
tinct subsection when the Clayton Act was amended in 1955—the first
becoming Section 5(a), and the second, Section 5 (b)." Although vari-
ous courts have reached different conclusions as to the legislative pur-
pose underlying section 5(b), congressional intent has been a primary
consideration of the courts in determining when to apply the tolling
provision. 2' The conclusion of each court considering the issue of intent
has depended largely upon whether the inquiry was based on an exam-
ination of the face of section 5 as a whole or on an examination of the
face of section 5(b) by itself, along with the history surrounding its
enactment. It appears that, until recently, the intent of the tolling pro-
vision was determined on the former basis, to the almost complete
exclusion of the latter.
By the time of the 1955 amendments to the Clayton Act, a line of
federal cases had held that the two provisions of Section 5 were ad-
dressed to the same legislative intent and were coextensive in their
application.22 It appears to have been assumed that the purpose of the
tolling provision was to preserve the benefits of the provision granting
the prima facie case. The early cases accordingly held that the statute
of limitations could be suspended only long enough to permit the pri-
vate plaintiff to obtain prima facie evidence in the form of a judgment
in a prior government action. If the rules of collateral estoppel" did
not apply, the courts did not permit tolling. In Christensen v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc.," for example, the plaintiff attempted to apply the
tolling provision against corporate defendants which had not been
parties to the prior government suit. The tolling provision was held
not to apply because the decree obtained in the government suit could
not have been introduced in evidence under the terms of section 5 (a). 25
The notion that the operation of section 5(b) is limited to matters
of collateral estoppel was perhaps most clearly articulated in Sun
and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding
shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter:
Provided, however, That whenever the running of the statute of limitations in
respect of a cause of action arising under section 15 of this title is suspended
hereunder, any action to enforce such cause of action shall be forever barred
unless commenced either within the period of suspension or within four years
after the cause of action accrued.
20 Act of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 2, 69 Stat. 283.
21 See, e.g., Sun Theatre Corp. v. RICO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d 284 (7th
Cir. 1954) ; Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956).
22 See, e.g., Electric Theater Co. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 113 F.
Supp. 937 (W.D. Mo. 1953); Sun Theatre Corp. v. RICO Radio Pictures, Inc., 213 F.2d
284 (7th Cir. 1954); Steiner v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 232 F.2d 190 (9th
Cir. 1956).
23 Under the doctrine of "collateral estoppel," a judgment, whether in favor
of plaintiff or defendent, is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties
on a different claim as to issues actually litigated and determined in the prior action.
Stone v. William Stienen Mfg. Co., 7 N.J. Super. 321, 328, 70 A.2d 803, 807 (1949).
24 95 F. Supp. 446 (D. Utah 1951).
25 Id. at 455.
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Theatre Corp. v. RICO Radio Pictures, Inc." Although the court in
that case stated that the purpose of section 5 was to protect the private
party's rights, it went on to construe that section narrowly. The pur-
pose of the second paragraph, according to Sun Theatre, was to insure
for the injured party "the full fruits of the government's case.' This
was to be accomplished by suspending the running of the statute of
limitations during the pendency of the government's suit in favor of a
party who had been injured by the same violation. The wording of the
statute—" [tolling limitations] in respect of each and every private
right of action . . . based in whole or in part on any matter complained
of [in the government suit] —led the court to conclude that the par-
ties and the facts had to be identical:
Neither logic nor public policy considerations demand, or
even permit, us to say that the pendency of a government
antitrust suit operates to suspend the running of the statute
as to every party who participated, either locally or nation-
ally, in the nationwide combination condemned thereby with-
out regard to whether or not he was named therein as a
defendant. Rather, the suspension provisions must be con-
strued in the light of what can be accomplished thereby. Our
hypothetical complaint charges and our hypothetical decree
finds that A, B, C and D conspired together to eliminate com-
petition on a national scale. The decree is prima fade evi-
dence as to this question only. P reaps the full benefit of
Section 5 if the statute is suspended as to the parties named.
If a different result is desirable, provision for its promulgation
is a function of the Congress, not of the courts."
As late as 1956, it was held in Steiner v. 20th Century-Fox Film
Corp." that in order for the tolling provision to apply, there had to be
an identity of subject matter between the private suit and the govern-
ment action on which it was based:
General allegations of conduct in violation of the antitrust
laws unrelated to the same conduct alleged in a public suit
are insufficient to toll the running of a statute of limitations.
A greater similarity is needed than that the same conspiracies
are alleged. The same means must be used to achieve the
same objectives of the same conspiracies by the same defen-
dants."
Thus even after the 1955 amendments to the Clayton Act, the courts
appeared to attach little significance to the division of Section 5. It was
28 213 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1954).
27
 Id. at 291.
28 Id.
29
 232 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1956).
39
 Id. at 196.
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assumed that the second paragraph was intended only to give greater
operative effect to the collateral estoppel provision of the first para-
graph. As long as this assumption prevailed, those who had been in-
jured by the effects of antitrust conspiracies could obtain the treble-
damage remedy only with great difficulty."
Prior to 1971, it was also generally assumed that an antitrust
cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, at
the time a prospective defendant commits an act which injures the
plaintiff's business.32 In the context of an antitrust conspiracy, it often
takes many months or even years for a plaintiff to begin to feel the
injurious effects of such an act; even then he may be at a loss to
explain the decline in his business. Without help, he may never dis-
cover the existence of a conspiracy or the identity of its perpetrators.
Although he may suspect a conspiracy, he may be unable to prove
anything. Situations are readily conceived in which the limitations
period has almost run out by the time the government brings action
against the conspirators; yet this may be the first time the plaintiff is
able to discover what has happened to him. Under the rule of Steiner,
Christensen, and Sun Theatre, if for some reason the government
failed to join a particular conspirator as a defendant in its suit, a
plaintiff whose damage had resulted largely or primarily from that
conspirator's participation might lose his right of action before he even
knew that he had been injured.
Decisions such as those just mentioned had the effect of limiting
the availability of the private antitrust remedy." They resulted largely
from the assumption that the two parts of section 5 were addressed to
the same legislative purpose and, as such, were coextensive in their
application. However, once the courts began to consider the second
paragraph as independent of the first, their treatment of the entire sec-
tion began to yield a different result. In 1961, the Tenth Circuit ruled
in Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Nisley" that the application of
section 5(b) is not limited to the evidentiary rules of estoppel which
restrict section 5(a). That court held that, although "the competency
31 This difficulty is illustrated by the fact that between 1952 and 1958 private
plaintiffs in treble damage suits won 20 cases and lost 115, for a ratio of about
6 to 1 in favor of defendants. In private suits for injunctive relief only, there were
eight victories as opposed to nine losses, or almost an even split during that period.
Government suits during that period resulted in 31 government victories and 39
government defeats, for a ratio of about 4 to 3. Bicks, the Department of Justice
and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4 Antitrust Bull. 5, 11-12 (1959). Such figures
as these have been interpreted by some as an indication of judicial hostility to the treble
damage remedy. See Bicks, at 11-15; Note, Private Treble Damage Antitrust Sults:
Measure of Damages for Destruction of All or Part of a Business, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
1566, 1569 (1967).
82 See, e.g., Suckow Borax Mines ConsoL, Inc. v. Borax Consoi., Ltd., 185 F.2d
196, 208 (9th Cir. 1950); Bluefields S.S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243 F. 1, 20
(3d Cir. 1917); Fulda and Kemme, The Statute of Limitations in Antitrust Litigation,
19 Ohio State L. J. 233 (1955).
38 See note 34 supra.
" 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961).
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of a government judgment in a private suit is necessarily restricted to
the requirements of due process, . . . the tolling of the statute during
the pendency of the government litigation is not so limited."" As long
as there was a "substantial identity of the subject matter," the running
of the statute would be suspended." Given this view as to the purpose
of the statute, the "identity" requirement of Steiner took on a new
meaning.
The problem of interpreting section 5(b) first came before the
Supreme Court in Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood
Finishing Co.," a case concerning the applicability of the tolling pro-
vision to Federal Trade Commission actions. In construing the legisla-
tive intent, the Court first examined the statute itself. It found certain
textual distinctions between sections 5(a) and 5(b) which suggested
that the two paragraphs were not wholly interdependent. The Court
noted, for example, that whereas the words "final judgment or decree"
appear to be of crucial significance in the application of the first para-
graph, the second paragraph tolls limitations during the pendency of
the prior government suit regardless of the government's success or
failure in prosecuting its case." Furthermore, whereas the first para-
graph provides for the use of the judgment or decree only "as to .. .
matters respecting which . . . [it] would be an estoppel as between
the parties," the tolling provision applies to "every private right of
action . . . based in whole or in part on any matter complained of" in
the government suit." The Court also surveyed the background to the
enactment of section 5, including congressional speeches and resolu-
tions," and concluded that there were differences in the policies behind
the two provisions of the section.
Whatever ambiguities may exist in the legislative history of
these provisions as to other questions, it is plain that in
§ 5(b) Congress meant to assist private litigants in utilizing
88 Id. at 569.
86
 Id. at 570.
87 381 U.S. 311 (1965).
88 Id. at 316.
89 Id. at 316-17.
40
 The Court cited, inter alia, the following legislative history:
Section 5, later CI 5(a) and 5(b), was passed in response to the plea of
President Wilson. In a speech to the Congress on January 20, 1914, he urged that
a law be enacted which would permit victims of antitrust violations to have
"redress upon the facts and judgments proved and entered in suits by the Gov-
ernment" and that "the statute of limitations . . . be suffered to run against
such litigants only from the date of the conclusion of the Government's action."
51 Cong. Rec. 1964. The broad aim of this enactment was to use "private
self-interest as a means of enforcement" of the antitrust laws. (Citations
omitted.) The "entire provision (was) intended to help persons of small means
who are injured in their property or business by combinations or corporations
violating the antitrust laws." H.R. Rep. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess,, 14.
Id. at 318-319.
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any benefits they might cull from government antitrust ac-
tions."
On the basis of these inquiries, the Court declared that the two provi-
sions of section 5 are not necessarily coextensive" and that the tolling
provision of section 5(b) applies to Federal Trade Commission ac-
tions."
In Leh v. General Petroleum Corp.," the Supreme Court began
to define the new scope afforded to section 5(b) by the Minnesota
Mining decision. The complaint in Leh differed significantly from that
in the prior government proceeding on which it was based. Whereas
the government complaint had alleged the operation of a conspiracy in
the Pacific states, Leh's complaint alleged a nationwide conspiracy.
Moreover, two of the defendants in the government suit were not
named as defendants in Leh's complaint." The Court held that these
subject-matter differences were not fatal, and that Leh's complaint,
being "based in whole or in part on any matter complained of," met
the requirements of the statute. The requirement of "identity" as de-
fined in Steiner was specifically rejected."
In Michigan v. Morton Salt Co., 41 a federal district court in Min-
nesota was faced with a fact situation similar to that in Christensen.
Several of the defendants in that case, who had not been named as
conspirators or as defendants in the prior government action, asserted
the statute of limitations) as a defense. They argued that the statute
was not tolled, citing the line of cases holding that the two provisions
of section 5(a) were coextensive." However, the district court found
that the Minnesota Mining and Leh decisions had rendered the theory
of coextensiveness obsolete, and that the independent policy of section
5 (b) outweighed any hardship caused to the defendants in suspending
the statute.4° The court therefore concluded that complete identity of
the parties was not required, and that the tolling provision could be
applied against a defendant notwithstanding the fact that he was nei-
ther a party to nor named a conspirator in the government action.°
The Morton Salt decision was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit in Hardy
Salt Co. v. Illinois,'" and the Third Circuit reached a similar result in
New Jersey v. Morton Salt Co." Thus, with the Seventh Circuit, in
Sun Theatre, and the Ninth Circuit, in Steiner, holding to the contrary,
41 Id. at 317.
42 Id. at 328.
48 Id. at 321-22.
44 382 U.S. 54 (1965).
45 Id. at 60-62.
45 Id. at 59.
47 259 F. Supp. 35 (D. Minn. 1966).
48 Id. at 53.
45 Id. at 54-56.
co Id. at 57.
G1 377 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1967).
52 387 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1967).
316
PRIVATE ANTITRUST ACTIONS
there was a substantial conflict on the question of the tolling provision
when that issue came before the Court in Zenith.
B. The Effect Of A Release On Antitrust Co -Conspirators
At early common law, when a release was given to one of two or
more joint tortfeasors, it necessarily released the others." The wrong-
doers having acted in concert, there existed only one cause of action,
and the injured party was entitled to only one satisfaction from what-
ever source. The release of one wrongdoer therefore barred action
against the other for the same wrong." Because early releases were
under seal, possible disputes over consideration were avoided. With the
diminished importance of the seal in the United States, the distinction
between a release (which is a surrender of a cause of action, and which
may be gratuitous or given for less than complete compensation) and
a satisfaction (which is an acceptance of full compensation for the
injury) became more important as a source of difficulty." Even where
a releasing instrument contained an express reservation of the releas-
or's rights against joint wrongdoers who were not parties to the release,
such a reservation was of no effect because only one recovery was
permitted." The common law rule has for some time been criticized
as tending to defeat the fair expectations and intentions of the parties
to the release." The rule has often compelled a plaintiff either to forego
any opportunity of obtaining what he could from one defendant with-
out suit or to give up his entire claim against the other defendant with-
out full compensation."
Dissatisfaction with the original common-law rule led many Amer-
ican courts and legislatures to modify it in various ways. The most
common of these has been to hold that, as distinguished from a release,
a covenant not to sue one of several joint tortfeasors does not operate
to release the others." By such a covenant, the plaintiff does not sur-
render his cause of action, but merely agrees that he will not enforce
it; he becomes liable for an equivalent amount of damages if he breaks
the agreement and sues." Many jurisdictions in which this distinction
is made place considerable importance on the form of the instrument,
and on whether the actual words used, are the words of a covenant not
to sue or the words of a release.° 1 In some jurisdictions, an instrument
which is in the form of a release but which also expressly reserves
rights against persons not parties to the release is treated as a covenant
not to sue."
68 W. Prosser, Law of Torts § 46 (3d ed. 1964).
54 See Annot., Joint Tortfeasors—Release, 73 A.L.R. 2d 403, 407 (1960).
65 Prosser, supra note 53 at § 46.
56 Id.
57
 73 A.L.R. 2d at 407.
58 Prosser, supra note 53 at § 46.
an 73 A.L.R. 2d at 418-19.
80 Prosser, supra note 53 at § 46.
01 73 A.L.I12d at 420.
62 Bolton v. Ziegler, 111. F. Supp. 516 (ND. Iowa 1953).
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In several states the common law rule has been modified by stat-
ute. The rule of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act is
that a release by the injured person of one tortfeasor does not release
other joint tortfeasors unless the release expressly so provides." On
the other hand, under the First Restatement of Torts and under the
Model Joint Obligations Act, the release of one joint tortfeasor gen-
erally releases all others, but it will not have such an effect if a plain-
tiff expressly reserves his rights against the others." It is much easier
for a plaintiff to reserve rights against joint tortfeasors under any of
the modified rules, but none of these rules completely eliminates the
difficulties which existed at common law. The injured person who re-
leases one tortfeasor for less than full satisfaction and only later dis-
covers the identity of other persons jointly responsible for his injury,
from whom he could have recovered more, is still at a disadvantage.
Unless he has provided in the releasing instrument for the subsequent
unforeseen discovery of additional obligors, he must be content with
less than full satisfaction for his injury. Attempts to achieve full satis-
faction in all cases where it is desired have yielded still another rule,
which is incorporated in the tentative draft of the Second Restatement
of Torts. This rule provides that the effect of a release upon a joint
tortfeasor not a party to that instrument is to be determined in accor-
dance with the intention of the parties.° 5 By this formulation, the need
to examine the instrument for magic words of one kind or another is
alleviated, and extrinsic evidence may be considered in appropriate
cases. 613
The common law rule, by which a release of one released all, was
employed by the federal courts in many cases governed by state or
federal common law.° The trial court in Twentieth Century-Fox Film
Corp. v. Winchester Drive-in Theatre, Inc.," found that the scope of
63 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 9 Uniform Laws Ann. 223. This
act has been adopted in Arkansas, Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-1001 to -1009 (1947) ; Delaware,
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, MI 6301-08 (1953) ; Hawaii, Hawaii Rev. Laws §§ 246-10 to -16
(1955) ; Maryland, Md. Ann. Code art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1957) ; New Mexico, N.M. Stat.
Ann. In 24-1-11 to -1-18 (1953) ; Pennsylvania, Pa. Stat. Ann. §§ 2082-89 (1967) ; Rhode
Island, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 10-6-1 to -6-11 (1956) ; South Dakota, S.D. Comp. Laws
§§ 15-8-11 to -8-22 (1967). Two States—Massachusetts and North Dakota—have adopted
a slightly different 1955 revision of the Act. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231B §§ 1-4
(Supp. 1971); N.D. Cent. Code §§ 32-3801 to -3804 (1960).
64 Restatement of Torts § 885(1) (1939). The Model Joint Obligations Act, 9B
Uniform Laws Ann. 355, has been adopted in four states. These states are Nevada, Nev.
Rev. Stat. ch. 101 (1967) ; New York, N.Y. General Obligations Law §§ 15-101 to -109
(1964) ; Utah, Utah Code Ann. §§ 15-4-1 to -4-7 (1953) ; Wisconsin, Wis. Stat. §§ 113.01-
.10.
65 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 885 (1) (Tent. Draft No. 16, 1970).
66 Id. § 885, comment d.
67 See, e.g., Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Wagner, 239 U.S. 452, 45657 (1915) ;
United States v. Price, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 83, 92 (1850); Hunt v. Rhodes, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
1, 16 (1828) ; however, it was expressly disapproved by the Supreme Court for cases
arising under federal patent law. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.,
377 U.S. 476, 501 (1964).
68 232 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
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the release in question was a matter of federal law, because the case
arose under the antitrust laws. The court concluded that the Uniform
Rule was the most appropriate rule in such a case." On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that federal,
not state, law should control, but, finding the First Restatement rule
to be the proper one, ruled that the defendants, against whom no rights
were reserved, had nevertheless been released." In Zenith, HRI
claimed, and the Second Circuit agreed, that the First Restatement rule
was most appropriate in cases arising under the federal antitrust laws;
and that since Zenith had not expressly reserved any rights against
HRI, the research company was entitled to the benefit of the releases
given by Zenith to some of HRI's co-conspirators in 1957. The court
of appeals therefore held that, since these releases barred recovery of
all damages flowing from any misconduct prior to 1959, damages suf-
fered by Zenith between 1959 and 1963 as the result of conduct oc-
curing before 1957 should not have been included in the award of the
trial court."
II. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc.:
TOLLING OF LIMITATIONS AND EFFECT OF RELEASE
Any uncertainties that remained concerning the application of the
tolling provision and the effects of a release were put to rest in the
Zenith decision. HRI had argued that part or all of Zenith's damages
were barred by the operation of the statute of limitations in Section 4B
of the Clayton Act." To this contention Zenith had replied that the
statute of limitations was tolled by operation of Section 5 (b) of the
Clayton Act" during the pendency of the original government action, 74
and for one year thereafter.
Although HRI had asserted that the counter-claimant's tolling
argument had been raised too late in the proceedings to be considered
on its merits, the Supreme Court in Zenith found otherwise." The
02
 Id. at 562.
70 351 F.2d 925, 931 (9th Cir. 1965).
71
 418 F.2d at 24. The releases here being discussed are the releases, described in
note 6 supra, which were given in settlement of the counterclaim of Zenith and Rauland
Corporation against Radio Corporation of America.
72 See note 9 supra.
78 See note 19 supra.
74 See note 7 supra.
75
 Before it reached this issue, however, the Supreme Court considered the holding of
the court of appeals that the district court had erroneously rejected HRI's defenses on
their merits rather than on waiver grounds.. Reversing this conclusion, the Supreme
Court held that, if the district court had ruled that the limitations and release defenses
were waived by the untimeliness of their presentation, it did not abuse its discretion,
401 U.S. at 332, Allowing these defenses to be litigated would have entitled Zenith to
avoid undue prejudice by perfecting its proof as to damages resulting from the operation
of the patent pools from 1959 to 1963. This would have required a virtual retrial of the
damage issue. At the time of the hearings in the district court, Fed. R. Civ, P. 12(h)
(1963) provided that "(a) party waives all defenses and objections which he does
not present" either by motion or in answer or reply. The grant of leave to amend
319
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
merits of the tolling issue had been briefly considered in a footnote to
the opinion of the court of appeals which had concluded that the law
of that circuit, as established by the Sun Theatre decision, was that
tolling takes place only with respect to defendants who were parties
to the prior government suit. 7° Finding this to be error, the Supreme
Court chose to consider Section 5 (b) of the Clayton Act as being
independent of Section 5 (a), and it examined the tolling provision to
determine its independent purpose. On the basis of this inquiry, the
Court upheld the Morton Salt interpretation of legislative intent, and
concluded that the tolling provision of section 5 (b) is available against
private treble damage action defendants not named as defendants or
conspirators in the government suit on which the private action is
based:
The language of 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) expressly provides for
tolling of the statute of limitations "in respect of every pri-
vate right of action . . . based in whole or in part on any
matter complained of" in the proceeding instituted by the
Government.. . . On the face of this section, a private party
who brings suit for a conspiracy against which the govern-
ment has already brought suit is undeniably basing its claim
in whole or in part upon the matter complained of in the
HRI's pleadings pursuant to Rule 15(a) was within the discretion of the trial court, but,
absent a showing that substantial justice would be served by such an amendment, the
Supreme Court determined that "[w]hatever HRI's reasons for not offering its limitations
and release defenses during trial . . . the trial court would not have erred in concluding
that they were waived." 401 U.S. at 333.
For two members of the Court, this was all that need have been decided. In a
separate opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Stewart, concurred as to the
overall result in the case an the grounds that the trial judge had properly rejected the
limitations and release defenses on grounds that they were belatedly raised, and that it
was unnecessary to reach any other issues. 401 U.S. at 349-54. However, in the absence of
a statement by the district judge as to why he did not amend his findings regarding the
Canadian market, the majority of the Court refused to make such an assumption. In-
stead, they proceeded to consider what conclusions would follow from a finding that the
defenses were not waived, eventually rejecting both defenses on their merits.
Before it could reach the tolling argument, the Court dealt with another issue
regarding timeliness of pleadings. Zenith had argued in its original brief before the district
court that the statute of limitations was tolled by reason of 4 5(b) of the Clayton Act
during the pendency of United States v. General Electric from November 28, 1958, to
November 1, 1962, and for one year thereafter. However, this argument was not formally
raised in Zenith's original complaint. The court of appeals had therefore assumed that
this issue, not having been raised at the trial in reply to HRI's affirmative defense, was
not properly before the Court, and it decided that Zenith was forever barred from
raising the claim of tolling. 418 F.2d at 25 n.3. The Supreme Court decided that it was
only fair to permit Zenith to amend its reply after trial. It is not necessary, the Court
explained, for a party to raise a claim of tolling until the defense of limitations is
raised, especially where, as here, there was little reason to anticipate such a defense.
Since the trial judge was ambiguous as to his reason for rejecting HRI's defenses, it
was only natural for Zenith to read that decision as having been made on waiver
grounds, and the Court ruled that Zenith should therefore not be penalized for failing to
enter a formal plea of tolling. 401 U.S. at 334-35.
're 418 F.2d at 25 n.3.
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government suit, even if the defendant named in the private
suit was named neither as a defendant nor as a conspirator
by the Government. If, that is, the Government sues only
certain conspirators, but also alleges and proves during trial
that others were conspirators, the fact of the tolling of the
statute against those so proved but not sued can hardly be
denied. Nor could tolling be denied if a defendant had never
been shown to be a conspirator by the evidence offered in the
earlier Government suit, but then had been proved to be such
in the subsequent private suit."
In the legislative history of section 5 (b), the Court found no indication
that Congress intended the tolling provision to apply only against par-
ties defendant in the government action. It determined that the aim of
Congress was to make private antitrust litigation an effective weapon
for the enforcement of the antitrust laws. Consistent with this aim,
Congress enacted section 5 (b) to enable the private plaintiff to receive
any benefits which might have been furnished by the prior government
action." With respect to those decisions which had confined the oper-
ation of the tolling provision to defendants named in the government
suit, the Court stated that these cases "fly in the face of the language
of the statute, are antithetical to its aims, and cannot be squared with
our recent decisions" in Minnesota Mining and Leh." It therefore
ruled that, by reason of the pendency of the government's suit against
HRI's co-conspirators, the four-year statute of limitations was tolled
at all times between November 24, 1958, and November 1, 1963. Since
the counterclaim was brought within that period, Zenith was entitled
to sue for any damage to its business occurring as a result of conspira-
torial conduct occurring at any time after November 24, 1954; that
is, at any time within four years prior to the filing of the government
suit."
With respect to the question of damages, HRI had contended—
and the court of appeals had agreed—that Zenith was entitled to re-
cover only that portion of its damages which resulted from conspira-
torial acts occurring during the statutory period. The argument was
that since the tolling argument had not been timely raised, and since
Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act did not provide for tolling against
persons such as HRI who were not parties to the prior government
suit, damages were recoverable only for the four years immediately
prior to the filing of the counterclaim. HRI argued that a cause of
action accrues when the defendant commits an act which injures the
plaintiff. Zenith had been able to show only one overt act in further-
ance of the conspiracy during the four year period prior to the filing
77 401 U.S. at 335 (emphasis added by Zenith Court).
78
 Id. at 336.
70 Id. at 336-37.
80 Id. at 337-38. However, this finding was subject to the Court's further determina-
tion as to the release issue.
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of the counterclaim—the sending on June 5, 1959, of a letter from the
manager of the Canadian Patent Pool threatening Zenith with suits for
patent infringements' HRI maintained that the only damages which
could be recovered were damages flowing from that act. Since the orig-
inal computation of damages was made on the assumption that full
damages began to accrue on May 22, 1959, and since the only overt
conspiratorial act did not occur until June 5, 1959, HRI argued that
at least some of the damages awarded Zenith in the Canadian market
were not attributable to that act." It was on the basis of this argument
that the court of appeals had concluded that the award of damages
was excessive."
In reversing this conclusion, the Supreme Court reasoned that,
because the statute of limitations was tolled, the period for which re-
covery was possible commenced on November 24, 1954. But if Zenith
had brought its suit in 1954 for conspiratorial conduct prior to that
time and had sought to recover for damages it expected to suffer be-
tween 1959 and 1963, those damages would have been denied as being
too speculative to be proven. Refusal to award future damages as too
speculative, the Court reasoned, is equivalent to holding that no cause
of action has yet accrued. In such an instance, therefore, the cause of
action for future damages accrues only on the date they are suffered.
To rule otherwise, the Court explained, would present a windfall to
the antitrust violator and would undermine the congressional purpose
that private actions serve as a bulwark of antitrust enforcement. The
Court concluded that since Zenith could not have recovered 1959-1963
damages if it had brought suit for them at the beginning of the ex-
tended limitations period, it must now recover all damages which it
suffered during the four year period to which Zenith had limited its
claim of damages."
HRI contended, however, that, irrespective of the Court's disposi-
tion concerning the limitations defense, part or all of Zenith's claim
for damages was barred by the releases given by Zenith to HRI's co-
conspirators in 1957." Before determining the effect of these releases,
the Supreme Court reviewed the prevailing rules as to when the release
of one joint tortfeasor releases other jointly-liable tortfeasors who were
not parties to or named in the release. The Court first considered the
applicability to antitrust treble damage suits of the "ancient common-
law rule, which was grounded upon a formalistic doctrine that a release
extinguished the cause of action to which it related."" Private anti-
trust litigation, the Court explained, is usually multi-party and multi-
state in character, for conspirators must often be sued in a number of
81
 This is the same letter described in note 6 supra.
82 Respondent's Brief at 18-41, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.,
401 U.S. 321 (1971).
88 418 F.2d at 25-26.
84 401 U.S. at 338-42.
85 See note 6 supra.
86
 401 U.S. at 343.
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different states if they are to be reached. While defendants in some
states may be willing to enter into settlements, defendants in other
states may refuse to do so. Therefore, the Court determined, to adopt
the "ancient common-law rule" would frustrate partial settlements and
thereby promote litigation." Having recently rejected this rule as to
patent infringement suits," the Court now rejected it as to antitrust
suits. The Court likewise disposed of the Uniform and First Restate-
ment rules, saying that to adopt either of them "would be to create a
trap for unwary plaintiffs' attorneys."" The Court chose, instead, to
adopt the Second Restatement's "intention" rule as the rule "most
consistent with the aims and purposes of the treble damage remedy
under the antitrust laws . . .. The straightforward rule is that a party
releases only those other parties whom he intends to release."" Since
HRI was not a party to the release, the Court looked to parole evidence
to determine the intention of the parties9i On the basis of the contract
in which the parties in 1957 agreed to exchange releases, the Court
determined that the releases were intended to bind or benefit the named
parties and their parents and subsidiaries. HRI, being neither a party
to the releases nor a parent or subsidiary of a party to the releases,
was therefore ruled not entitled to the benefits of the releases.
The Court noted, however, that if any portion of the $10,000,000
received by Zenith in return for the 1957 releases was to provide com-
pensation for future damages Zenith anticipated it would suffer_ from
pre-1957 conspiratorial acts, that amount would not be chargeable to
HRI.
It is settled that, entirely apart from any release, a plaintiff
who has recovered any item of damage from one coconspira-
tor may not again recover the same item from another con-
spirator; the law, that is, does not permit a plaintiff to recover
double payment."
This presented only a minor problem for the Court, however, because
undisputed evidence at trial had disclosed that the entire amount of
the settlement was understood by the parties as compensation only for
Zenith's damages up to the time of the releases.
III. CONCLUSION
The method by which the Court arrived at its rulings is perhaps
as significant as the rulings themselves. Not content merely to resolve
87
 Id. at 347.
88 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
8° 401 U.S. at 347.
00 Id. at 346-47.
91 The Court stated that:	 '-
Resort may he had to the contract in construing the release since the parole
evidence rule [under the Restatement (Second) of Torts] is . . . operative only
as to parties to a document, and HRI here was not a party to the release.
Id. at 347 n.12.
92 Id. at 348.
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the issues squarely before it, the Court seems to have actively sought
to further a general policy. Great weight appears to have been attached
to the importance of the treble damage suit as a means of enforcing
the antitrust laws.' This consideration seems to have outweighed any
concern over the inconvenience that antitrust defendants might suffer
as a result of the Court's decision. Henceforth, the tolling provision
will be construed in a way that best facilitates private enforcement of
the antitrust laws. With respect to damages, a cause of action will
accrue when the damages are suffered, regardless of when the precipi-
tating act occurred. When a co-conspirator, not a party to a release,
attempts to raise the release as an affirmative defense, he will no longer
be able to escape liability merely by showing that such a release exists;
rather, he will have to demonstrate that the parties intended by that
instrument to release him as well. In the reasoning of the Court, these
rules are the most appropriate ones for private treble damage actions
because they are the ones most conducive to effective antitrust enforce-
ment.
This marked policy-directed approach has elicited at least one
accusation of "unwonted aggressiveness" against antitrust defen-
dants." The validity of such an accusation, however, is doubtful. The
increased burden imposed on antitrust defendants is far from over-
whelming. It is true that they can no longer escape liability by auto-
matically raising the statute of limitations or merely pointing to a
general release. It is also true that they will be called on in their de-
fense to produce evidence of events which occurred many years before
the initiation of the suit. Nevertheless, the burden resting on the plain-
tiff remains substantial. Although he benefits from the tolling provision,
he cannot make use of a judgment obtained in a prior government suit
in which his defendant was not a named party. This burden is com-
pounded by the fact that the plaintiff often has considerably greater
difficulty in obtaining crucial information which is usually within the
exclusive knowledge of the conspirators. With respect to the defen-
dant's burden of having to produce in his behalf what might be termed
"stale" evidence, it should be noted that any corporation that is asso-
ciated in any way—culpably or not—with organizations which are sued
by the government for violation of the antitrust laws is put on sufficient
notice to preserve any evidence which might be used in its own defense
in the event it is joined in a subsequent treble damage suit.
Since injunctions and fines are of little deterrent effect against
giant concentrations of economic power," private treble damage ac-
tions are necessary if the antitrust laws are to be effectively enforced.
As has been noted, however, these actions have had a dismal success
ga Id. at 336, 340.
94 Sec 40 U.S.L.W. 3037 (1971).
'5 Maximum fine for violation of the Sherman Art is $50,000. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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rate." It is anticipated that Zenith's holdings concerning limitations
and releases will reverse this pattern and make treble damage actions
the enforcement weapon they were intended to be.
CHARLES S. JOHNSON, III
98 Sec note 31 supra.
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